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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee/ 
Respondent, 
v. 
ROGER L. STRADER, 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner. 
Case No. 940244-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant/Petitioner, Roger L. Strader, files this 
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Mr. Strader continues to assert that the offenses he 
was charged with arose under a single criminal episode, and he is 
entitled to dismissal of the theft and possession charges by virtue 
of the prior prosecution of the false information charge. Mr. 
Strader relies on his previously filed opening brief and reply in 
support of this contention. 
This petition only addresses perceived flaws in the legal 
analysis utilized by this Court in its opinion, without rearguing 
Mr. Strader's underlying premise. 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 11 (i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent 
of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional 
plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, 
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the 
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any 
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on 
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
ISSUES OF LAW WHICH NEED TO BE READDRESSED 
1. The opinion incorrectly implies that when reviewing 
issues preserved pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, the terms 
of the conditional plea bargain struck may in some fashion render 
moot one or more issues raised in the reserved motion. The opinion 
erroneously fails to address whether the theft charge should have 
been dismissed by virtue of the prior prosecution on the false 
information charge. This claim must be addressed. 
2. The opinion incorrectly sets forth a bifurcated 
standard for assessing claims under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402(2) 
and 76-1-403(1), whereby the statutes are given a narrow 
interpretation when assessing claims of defendants and an expansive 
interpretation when assessing the claims of the prosecution, in 
violation of Mr. Strader's right to equal protection of the laws 
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under the fourteenth amendment and right to uniform operation of 
laws under article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE MERITS OF ISSUES PRESERVED PURSUANT 
TO CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS UNDER SERY AND 
RULE 11(i) ARE UNAFFECTED BY THE TERMS OF THE 
CONDITIONAL PLEA AGREEMENT REACHED. 
In its opinion, this Court stated: 
Because the theft charge was ultimately 
dismissed as part of the plea arrangement, the sole issue 
for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to dismiss the charge of possession of a 
controlled substance, based on its determination that the 
charge did not arise from the same criminal episode as 
the previously prosecuted charge of giving false 
identification to a police officer. 
State v. Strader, No. 940244-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App., August 
31, 1995) (Addendum A). To the contrary, this Court was required 
to address all issues preserved by Mr. Strader's conditional guilty 
plea. The individual terms of the plea agreement struck have no 
bearing on the preserved issues raised on appeal. 
A. NEITHER RULE 11 (i) NOR CONDITIONAL PLEA 
CASE LAW PROVIDE THAT REVIEW OF A 
PRESERVED ISSUE IS IN ANY WAY LIMITED BY 
THE CONDITIONAL PLEA STRUCK. 
If a defendant prevails on appeal from a conditional 
guilty plea, the defendant is permitted to withdraw his or her 
plea. Rule 11(i) . After the conditional plea is withdrawn, the 
original charges would again be pending. Thus, the theft charge 
against Mr. Strader remains dismissed only if his appeal is not 
meritorious; if any aspect of his appeal is meritorious, then he is 
permitted to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial on the 
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reinstated charges of theft and possession (to whatever extent the 
appellate decision did not bar prosecution). 
In cases that proceed to trial where an acquittal has 
been entered on a charge, any pretrial issue concerning only that 
charge is moot, as double jeopardy considerations preclude further 
prosecution on that charge. But because the charges dismissed as 
part of a conditional plea will be reinstated if the appeal is 
successful and the plea withdrawn, the terms of the plea agreement 
cannot render any portion of the preserved issues moot. 
This Court did not directly address whether the theft 
charge should have been dismissed. If on the merits this Court 
were to determine that the theft charge should have been dismissed, 
regardless of the result with respect to the possession charge, Mr. 
Strader would be the prevailing party on appeal. He would be 
entitled to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial on what remained 
of the case. This Court's reasoning and failure to reach the issue 
of whether the theft charge should have been dismissed has deprived 
Mr. Strader of the benefit of a determination of this issue on 
appeal, as promised and guaranteed by his conditional plea bargain. 
By this Court's reasoning, if Mr. Strader had been 
offered a conditional plea to a second charge of false information 
(with dismissal of both the theft and possession charges) , then the 
entire appeal would have been moot -- the possession and theft 
charges would have been dismissed as part of the plea bargain. 
This incorrect interpretation of the conditional guilty plea 
procedure places unwarranted restrictions on conditional guilty 
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pleas not justified by Rule 11 (i) or case law interpreting 
conditional plea practice. Pretrial rulings preserved pursuant to 
conditional guilty pleas should be reviewed in their entirety on 
appeal, without reference to the plea bargain struck. 
B. THE REASONING APPLIED HERE WOULD OPERATE 
AS A PROCEDURAL BAR TO REINSTATEMENT OF 
CHARGES WHEN A DEFENDANT'S APPEAL OF A 
PRESERVED ISSUE IS SUCCESSFUL, AND THE 
CONDITIONAL PLEA IS WITHDRAWN. 
An appellate matter can only be moot if the issue cannot 
arise again. Thus, as a matter of logical consistency, this 
Court's ruling ipso facto requires that charges dismissed pursuant 
to a conditional guilty plea may not be pursued, even after success 
on appeal and withdrawal of that plea. Appellant does not believe 
that this new procedural bar inuring to the benefit of defendants 
was considered or intended by the Court, but it follows as a 
necessary incident to the analysis employed in the Strader opinion. 
This Court should rehear whether Mr. Strader's theft 
conviction was barred by the prior prosecution of the false 
information charge, address that claim on the merits, and issue a 
revised opinion accordingly. 
POINT II. THIS COURT'S ADOPTION OF A DOUBLE 
STANDARD IN INTERPRETATION OF §§ 76-1-402(2) 
AND 76-1-403(1) VIOLATES MR. STRADER'S RIGHTS 
TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS AND UNIFORM 
OPERATION OF LAWS UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
In the "Scope of Analysis" section of this Court's 
opinion, the majority adopts a double standard for interpreting 
claims under §§ 76-1-402(2) and 76-1-403(1): 
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An expansive interpretation of "single criminal 
episode" is appropriate in cases contesting joinder of 
multiple offenses. Rule 9.5, section 76-1-402(2), and 
section 76-1-403(1), while related to double jeopardy," 
expand the scope of offenses barred from multiple trials 
beyond "the same offense" focus in double jeopardy [cite 
omitted] , to all offenses arising from a "single criminal 
episode."" An expansive interpretation promotes the 
general joinder intent of Rule 9.5 and relevant statutes, 
i.e., to avoid subjecting the defendant to separate 
trials and to promote judicial economy. [1 . . . 
On the other hand, the protection against 
double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional right 
which prevents a defendant from being tried more than 
once for the same crime. U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah 
Const, art. I, § 1 2 . Accordingly, review of a double 
jeopardy issue employs a very narrow perspective, 
focusing on whether a subsequent prosecution is for the 
same offense without regard to whether multiple offenses 
were part of the same criminal episode. [cites omitted] . 
On balance, the circumstances of Strader's 
claim place this case closer to a double jeopardy 
analysis than to a joinder of offenses analysis." 
Strader, slip op. at 4-6 (Orme and Jackson, JJ., with Davis, J., 
concurring in the judgment but dissenting from this holding) . The 
application of a "very narrow perspective" to Mr. Strader's claims, 
which arise under statutes usually given an "expansive 
interpretation," violates equal protection and uniform application 
of laws. 
A. NOTHING ON THE FACE OF §§ 76-1-401 ET 
SEQ. WARRANTS APPLICATION OF A BIFURCATED 
STANDARD FOR INTERPRETATION BASED ON THE 
PARTY SEEKING RELIEF. 
The bifurcated standard adopted in this opinion for 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 et seq. , based on 
which party is seeking application of the statute, is not warranted 
by the plain language of the statutes. Nothing on the face of the 
statutes provides grounds for holding defendants to a stricter 
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standard than the State. Such a judicial interpretation is 
violative of equal protection and due process. 
The right to equal protection applies not only with 
respect to legislative enactments, but also to judicial actions. 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) 
(court action in enforcing racial restrictive covenant constitutes 
state action for fourteenth amendment purposes); Tassian v. People, 
731 P.2d 672, 674 & n.4, (Colo. 1987) (striking down court rule 
disallowing acceptance of personal checks from pro se litigants). 
This Court's opinion, and the rule of law it announces, accords 
disparate treatment to two distinct groups of litigants: criminal 
defendants, on the one hand, and the prosecutorial entities that 
prosecute them, on the other hand. The plain language of the 
statutes at issue justifies no such arbitrary distinction between 
these classes of litigants. 
B. THIS COURT'S DOUBLE STANDARD SUBVERTS THE 
PURPOSES AND OBJECTS RULE 9.5, §§ 76-1-
401 ET SEQ., AND THE CRIMINAL CODE IN 
GENERAL. 
In its opinion, this Court correctly noted that "an 
expansive interpretation promotes the general joinder intent of 
Rule 9.5 and relevant statutes, i.e., to avoid subjecting the 
defendant to separate trials and to promote judicial economy." 
Strader, slip op. at 5-6. While paying lip service to this obvious 
intent of the statutes, this Court inexplicably ignores this 
legislative intent by determining that a very narrow construction 
is both necessary and appropriate when criminal defendants seek 
relief under the statutes. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1995) states: 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly 
construed shall not apply to this code, any of its 
provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this 
state. All provisions of this code and offenses defined 
by the laws of this state shall be construed according to 
the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the objects of the law and general purposed of 
Section 76-1-104. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(4) (1995), in turn provides that one of 
the purposes of the code is to " [p]revent arbitrary or oppressive 
treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses." 
Contrary to the express mandate of § 76-1-106, this Court 
has ruled that §§ 76-1-401 et seq. are to be strictly construed. 
This further subverts one of the criminal code purposes set forth 
in § 76-1-104(4), to prevent arbitrary and oppressive treatment of 
Mr. Strader by multiple prosecutions in multiple forums. This 
Court is not at liberty to substitute its own judgment for that of 
the legislature. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995) . 
While it might have been appropriate for the legislature 
to leave questions of joinder in the sole discretion of the 
prosecuting entity, the legislature declined to do so. Sections 
76-1-401 et sequitur, in conjunction with Rule 9.5, establish a 
comprehensive statutory scheme governing the joinder of charges in 
criminal cases. This Court's judicial construction of those 
statutes has resulted in the substitution of this Court's judgment, 
that prosecutors should have wide discretion in the manner in which 
criminal charges arising from a single criminal episode are filed, 
for the judgment of the legislature, that all charges should be 
brought in a single proceeding. 
8 
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 [A] statute which, when properly applied would be fair 
and consistent in application, may nevertheless be applied in such 
a discriminatory manner as to violate constitutional guarantees of 
equal protection of the law and nondiscrimination, in which case 
relief should be granted to one aggrieved by such discriminatory 
application." Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391, 396 
(Utah 1964) . This Court should rehear this case, and issue an 
opinion indicating that §§ 76-1-401 et seq. are subject to a 
uniform judicial interpretation regardless of the party seeking 
relief thereunder. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Strader respectfully requests 
that this Court rehear this case and issue an amended opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ttt day of September, 1995. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DAVID P. S. MACK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this Hit day of 
September, 1995. 
4M— 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of September, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
State v. Strader, No. 940244-CA (Utah App. 1995) 
RLED 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. AUG 3 1 1995 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
P l a i n t i f f and Appel lee , 
v . 
Roger L. Strader, 
Defendant and Appel lant . 
OPINION 
(For Publ i ca t ion) 
Case No. 940244-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 31, 1995) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Attorneys: Robert K. Heineman and David P.S. Mack, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Kris Leonard and Jan Graham, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson. 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Roger L. Strader pled guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1994), but retained his right to appeal the trial 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See State v. Serv. 758 
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). Strader claims on appeal that 
his prior prosecution on a different charge arising from the same 
criminal episode precludes his prosecution for possession of a 
controlled substance. We affirm. 
FACTS 
The facts of this case are undisputed. On the night of July 
21, 1992, Officer Jerry Randall of the West Valley Police 
Department was preparing paperwork while sitting in his patrol 
car in a parking lot at 3900 West and 3*390 South. At 
approximately 11:00 p.m., he observed a vehicle pull into an 
adjacent construction site. A man, later identified as Strader, 
exited the vehicle, entered a building on the site,"* returned 
carrying an object which he placed in the vehicle, and drove 
away. Officer Randall stopped the vehicle and asked Strader, who 
was driving, for identification. 
Strader stated he had no identification, but gave his name 
as Stanley Kent Strader. After Officer Randall questioned him 
about the object in the back seat, a circular saw, Strader said 
he was picking it up for a friend named Tony Ochoa. Strader's 
female passenger left the scene to retrieve his identification 
from their nearby apartment. Another man, professing to be Tony 
Ochoa, returned with a driver's license issued to Earl Nesbitt, 
which contained a picture resembling Strader. However, the 
license had obviously been altered. The top lamination layer had 
been peeled back to allow insertion of Strader's picture. 
Officer Randall placed Strader under arrest for giving false 
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1995). After a check on 
the vehicle's license plates revealed that the plates belonged to 
another vehicle, Officer Randall impounded the vehicle. In the 
course of the ensuing inventory search, Officer Randall found a 
loaded syringe under the driver's seat and a packet of syringes 
in the glove compartment. A canine unit discovered another 
syringe under a seat cover. Subsequent tests revealed that some 
of the syringes contained methamphetamine. Meanwhile, another 
officer found the owner of the circular saw, who identified it as 
property stolen from him. 
Strader was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on three 
charges: giving false identification to a police officer, a 
class C misdemeanor; theft, a class A misdemeanor; and possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. He was 
subsequently charged by the West Valley City prosecutor with the 
misdemeanor false identification offense. He entered a guilty 
plea to this charge, in Circuit Court, on September 3, 1992. 
The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office later filed charges 
for all three offenses. At his arraignment in Third District 
Court on September 27, 1993, Strader entered a plea of not 
guilty. Two months later, he filed a motion to dismiss all 
charges. The court held a hearing on the motion, at which time 
it dismissed the charge for false identification because the same 
charge had already been prosecuted in Circuit Court the previous 
year. The court declined to dismiss the remaining counts for 
theft and possession of a controlled substance. The following 
month, pursuant to a plea agreement, the court dismissed the 
theft charge and Strader changed his plea to guilty on the 
possession charge. However, Strader reserved his right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to dismiss all charges pursuant to State 
v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). 
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In its findings and conclusions issued March 9, 1994, the 
trial court determined that Strader's act of giving false 
identification to a police officer was not part of the same 
criminal episode, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995), 
as the other offenses of theft and possession of a controlled 
substance.1 Strader now appeals from the trial court's refusal, 
premised on that conclusion, to dismiss all charges. 
ISSUE 
Because the theft charge was ultimately dismissed as part of 
the plea arrangement, the sole issue for our consideration is 
whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge 
of possession of a controlled substance, based on its 
determination that the charge did not arise from the same 
criminal episode as the previously prosecuted charge of giving 
false identification to a police officer.2 
1. The trial court made, inter alia, the following conclusions 
of law: 
3. The defendant gave the false name to the 
police officer before the drugs were 
discovered and before the theft had been 
confirmed. The defendant, by giving a false 
name may have been trying to escape 
apprehension by the officer but this action 
did not have the same criminal objective and 
was not related to the theft or the 
possession of drugs. 
4. The false identification to a police 
officer, theft and possession of a controlled 
substance charges were not part of a single 
criminal episode as defined by § 76-1-401 
. . . . There was not a single criminal 
objective and they are [subject to] different 
statutes, have different elements, would be 
prosecuted by different jurisdictions and 
have different penalties. 
2. For purposes of illustration and analysis, we will 
nonetheless refer to the theft charge later in this opinion in 
the context of examining the relationship of the three offenses 
to each other. Strader also argues that the inclusion of all 
three charges in a single information must be taken as an 
admission by the State that all were part of a single criminal 
episode. This argument is without merit and we decline to 
address it. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888^ -89 (Utah 
1989); State v. Rancrel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 n.3 (Utah App. 1993). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The "trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law," Ward v. Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 
1990), and thus is reviewed for correctness and accorded no 
particular deference. See id.; Salt Lake Citv v. Emerson, 861 
P.2d 443, 445 (Utah App. 1993). 
ANALYSIS 
1. Applicable Law 
Our starting point is the two-prong definition of "single 
criminal episode" found in the Utah Criminal Code: "all conduct 
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or 
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995) (emphasis added). 
If multiple offenses meet the definition of a single 
criminal episode, the applicable charges must "be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with 
the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged . . . 
[and] may not be separated except by order of the court and for 
good cause shown." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(a), (b). 
Additionally, there are two statutes pertinent to joinder of 
offenses. If multiple charges result from the same criminal 
episode, a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials "unless 
the court otherwise orders to promote justice." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(2) (1995). If a defendant has already been prosecuted 
for an offense, he or she cannot be prosecuted subsequently for 
another offense arising out of the same criminal episode, so long 
as the later offense "was or should have been tried under 
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution." Id. § 76-1-
403(1)(a). However, neither Rule 9.5 nor the referenced statutes 
apply if the offenses at issue are not part of the same criminal 
episode, in which case a defendant may be properly prosecuted in 
separate proceedings. 
2. Scope of Analysis 
Strader's appeal is somewhat atypical. It is not the usual 
defendant who clamors for all pending charges against him to be 
tried together before the same jury. The conventional wisdom 
holds that a jury will consider a charge more fairly if untainted 
by hearing the details of an entire series of charges pending 
940244-CA 4 
against the defendant.3 In cases determining joinder issues, 
defendants typically contest joinder by attempting to show the 
offenses did not arise from a single criminal episode and, thus, 
that their severance and separate trial motions should have been 
granted. 
In contesting the separate prosecution of his offenses, 
Strader contends the false information offense was part of the 
same episode as the theft and drug possession offenses. 
Emphasizing that he claims violation of the joinder provisions 
found in section 76-1-402(2), section 76-1-403(1)(a), and Rule 
9.5(1) rather than a violation of the constitutional double 
jeopardy doctrine, Strader argues that we should take an 
expansive view in analyzing whether the multiple offenses indeed 
arise from the same criminal episode. As Strader recognizes, the 
opposing interpretive model is that suggested by double jeopardy 
cases, in which a rather restrictive interpretation is given to 
the key term "same offence." U.S. Const, amend. V. As is 
hereafter explained, neither of these approaches is wholly 
appropriate to Strader7s claim. 
An expansive interpretation of "single criminal episode" is 
appropriate in cases contesting joinder of multiple offenses. 
Rule 9.5, section 76-1-402(2), and section 76-1-403(1), while 
related to double jeopardy,4 expand the scope of offenses barred 
from multiple trials beyond "the same offense" focus in double 
jeopardy, see State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987), 
to all offenses arising from a "single criminal episode."5 An 
expansive interpretation promotes the general joinder intent of 
Rule 9.5 and relevant statutes, i.e., to avoid subjecting the 
3. Indeed, a cynic might suggest that if the three charges 
would have been brought together initially, Strader would have 
moved to sever, arguing that the three offenses were completely 
distinct wrongs and that he would be prejudiced if they were all 
tried together. 
4. Both statutes are found in Part 4 of the Criminal Code, 
entitled "Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy." Strader's 
counsel noted during the hearing that a double jeopardy argument 
was "closely related but a different beast than the one we're 
talking about here." 
5. This court has stated that cases considering whether 
offenses "are separate for double jeopardy purposes" are not 
applicable in single episode cases contesting the court's 
decision to join offenses or deny a motion for severance. State 
v. Looez. 789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah App. 1990). 
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defendant to separate trials and to promote judicial economy. 
See State v, Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Gotfrev. 598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979). Also, because 
appellate courts review decisions regarding joinder or severance 
of offenses only for an abuse of discretion, Germonto, 868 P.2d 
at 59; State v. Haaa, 735 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1987), it follows 
that the reviewing court would, as a practical matter, take a 
broad view of what constitutes a single criminal episode in that 
context. 
On the other hand, the protection against double jeopardy is 
a fundamental constitutional right which prevents a defendant 
from being tried more than once for the same crime. U.S. Const, 
amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Accordingly, review of a ^  
double jeopardy issue employs a very narrow perspective, focusing 
on whether a subsequent prosecution is for the same offense 
without regard to whether multiple offenses were part of the same 
criminal episode. See State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 
1985) (holding successive burglaries of different areas in one 
apartment complex did not comprise the same offense); State v. 
Cornish. 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (holding car 
theft and failure to stop after traffic violation were distinct 
offenses not subject to double jeopardy analysis). See also 
State v. James, 631 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1981) (holding double 
jeopardy does not prevent multiple convictions for multiple 
offenses arising out of single criminal episode). 
On balance, the circumstances of Strader's claim place this 
case closer to a double jeopardy analysis than to a joinder of 
offenses analysis.7 He contends that a previous prosecution for 
6. Conversely, the trial court has discretion to order separate 
proceedings for offenses arising from the same criminal episode 
"to promote justice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2), and "for good 
cause shown." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(b). For example, severing 
the offenses may be appropriate if joinder would unduly prejudice 
a defendant and jeopardize his or her right to due process. See 
State ^. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980). 
7. Thus, the cases upon which Strader relies are unpersuasive 
because they are of the genre contesting joinder. In State v. 
Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), the defendant contested 
joinder of forgery with the charges of murder and robbery. The 
Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's severance motion, held that because the forged checks 
were stolen from the victim during the murder and robbery, all 
three offenses had the common criminal objective of obtaining 
property from the victim. Id. at 59. Other cases cited by 
F
 (continued...) 
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one offense bars the subsequent prosecution of a different 
offense because both are part of the same criminal episode. Such 
a claim is comparable to asserting double jeopardy bars a 
subsequent prosecution because both proceedings would involve the 
same offense. Accordingly, although our focus must be on the 
inherently broader term "criminal episode," in the unique posture 
of defendant's case we believe it is appropriate to take a 
narrow, rather than an expansive, view of what that term entails. 
3. Application to Facts 
As stated above, "all conduct which is closely related in 
time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a 
single criminal objective" comprises a single criminal episode. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995). There is no question, nor do 
the parties dispute, that both offenses pertinent here satisfied 
the temporal requirement of section 76-1-401. Officer Randall 
found the illegal controlled substance during a search conducted 
pursuant to and immediately after Strader's arrest for giving 
false identification. Accordingly, we limit our examination to 
the second prong of the statutory definition of a single criminal 
episode, i.e., whether the offenses for which Strader was charged 
were incident to the accomplishment of the same criminal 
objective. 
Whether the charge for false identification was incident to 
the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as the charge 
for possession of a controlled substance depends on the specific 
facts of the case viewed under to the totality of the 
circumstances.8 Additionally, the totality of facts and 
7. (...continued) 
Strader are similarly inapplicable because they uphold the trial 
court's decision to join offenses for trial on the rationale that 
they were all part of a single criminal episode. See State v. 
McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1988) (eight charges for sale of 
a controlled substance); State v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 
App. 19*90) (murder and child abuse) ; In re R.D.S. . 777 P.2d 532, 
538 (Utah App 1989) (kidnapping, child abuse, and homicide), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1990). Finally, in State v. 
Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), the Court considered "single 
criminal episode" in the context of admissibility of evidence 
rather than joinder or severance of offenses. Id. at 1141. 
8. The totality of circumstances approach is employed in a 
variety of criminal law contexts. See; e.g.. State v. Mabe, 864 
P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993) (determining whether confession was 
voluntary under totality of circumstances); State v. Case. 884 
(continued...) 
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circumstances is viewed objectively to determine whether there 
exists a common criminal objective. It would be inappropriate to 
decide the question based on whatever subjective intent the 
defendant may allege for the offenses at issue. C£. State v. 
Arrovo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1989) (categorizing "actual 
state of mind of the officer" as irrelevant in determining 
whether automobile stop was pretextual; objective evaluation 
required instead). Finally, as explained above, in cases like 
the instant one our perspective is narrow rather than expansive. 
We conclude that Strader's conduct in giving the incorrect 
name and a falsified drivers license to Officer Randall is not 
incident to his possession of a controlled substance or, for that 
matter, to his accomplishing the theft of the saw. 
The only possible nexus between the crimes is an intent to 
avoid arrest on the other charges by giving false identification. 
Yet Strader was already detained by Officer Randall, who had 
observed his involvement in what appeared to be theft activities, 
at the time he gave false information. His identity was 
inconsequential to his imminent arrest for theft under whatever 
name he cared to use. Use of a false identity might have 
deflected further problems by way of outstanding warrants, 
driving on a revoked license, or other similar legal 
entanglements, but it would have no bearing on the officer's 
investigative focus on Strader as the perpetrator of a theft 
committed in the officer's presence. Strader's suspicious 
activities at the construction site and possession of drugs were 
not absolved, explained, or mitigated by giving the officer his 
brother's name or an obviously altered driver's license.9 Also, 
8. (. ..continued) 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (examining totality of 
circumstances to determine whether articulable facts support 
reasonable suspicion); City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 
1388 (Utah App. 1994) (basing the determination of exigent 
circumstances for warrantless search on totality of 
circumstances). 
9. In State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per 
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court held that a crime committed to 
avoid arrest for a prior crime cannot always be considered as 
part of the same criminal episode. The Court later noted that 
"our failure to announce that such conduct always warrants 
joinder does not preclude us from concluding that under some 
circumstances, joinder may be proper." State v. Germonto, 868 
P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993). 
(continued...) 
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the fact he was driving a car with incorrect license plates and 
that he had a forged driver's license at hand seem to indicate 
that obscuring his identity was an ongoing and routine course of 
conduct with Strader and not specifically done to somehow further 
his theft or drug possession activities. 
Objectively viewing all of the facts and circumstances in a 
narrowly focused way, we conclude that because there was no 
common criminal purpose, the offense of false identification and 
the other offenses with which Strader was charged, in particular 
the drug offense to which he pled guilty, are not part of the 
same criminal episode for purposes of the issue before us. 
9. (...continued) 
In the instant case, the outcome may well have been 
different if the facts had created a stronger nexus of purpose 
between the offenses. Consider the following two hypothetical 
scenarios: In the first, Officer Randall finds a circular saw on 
the back seat with a bill of sale made out to "Joe Carpenter" and 
Strader tells him that his name is "Joe Carpenter." In the 
second hypothetical, Officer Randall observes Strader, carrying a 
circular saw, leave a construction site marked with a large sign 
reading "Beagle Boys Construction." Strader tells him his name 
is "Bart Beagle." In both scenarios, the false identification 
would be closely connected with the alleged theft activities 
because Strader, in order to evade arrest, would be using the 
names as a means to explain his legitimate presence at the 
construction site and/or his lawful possession of the saw. By 
contrast, in the instant case, Strader's use of his brother's 
identity and that of Earl Nesbitt did nothing to explain away his 
apparently unlawful taking of the saw. 
The drug offense is yet a further step removed from 
Strades's giving false information. But for his arrest under 
whatever name on theft charges, he would not have been arrested 
and his car searched and the syringes found. Nonetheless, one 
can envision a more purposeful connection between giving false 
information and possession of a controlled substance, as in this 
hypothetical situation: Officer Randall observes syringes in 
Strader's car, then asks Strader for identification. Strader 
produces a counterfeit police shield and introduces himself as 
"Earl Nesbitt, undercover agent with the Metro Narcotics Strike 
Force." In this scenario, he would employ a false identity in 
order to create a legitimate reason for possessing a controlled 
substance. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the purposes relevant here, the offense of false 
identification for which Strader was prosecuted was not part of 
the same criminal episode as the offense of possession of a 
controlled substance because there was no common criminal 
objective. Therefore, sections 76-1-402(2) and -403(1) do not 
bar the subsequent prosecution proceedings in district court. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Gregory^K. Orme, Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, £*foge 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge (concurring in result): 
In my view, the Scope of Analysis section of the main 
opinion is not only unnecessary to the result but analytically 
flawed. Strader is seeking to avail himself of the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 to -405 (1990); he is not claiming 
that he was "twice put in jeopardy" within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 
Moreover, Strader7s reliance upon cases in which the 
defendant is contesting joinder is totally appropriate. There is 
nothing in the statutes upon which Strader relies that suggests 
an "expansive" interpretation where the government is pursuing 
joinder or a "very narrow perspective" where the defendant is 
attempting to benefit from the statutory provisions.2 Thus, the 
majority's application of a double standard for interpreting the 
definition of a single criminal episode set out in section 76-1-
401 is unnecessarily confusing, especially where, as here, either 
1. See note four of the main opinion. 
2. Even if it is assumed that such an approach i^ appropriate 
to an analysis at the constitutional level. 
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interpretation would yield the same result. See State v. 
Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 59-60 (Utah 1993) (applying "expansive" 
interpretation, yet requiring nonetheless, as in the case at bar, 
that the theory for joinder "posit[] a single objective 
throughout the whole [criminal] episode") (emphasis added)• 
As stated in the terse, straightforward analysis in the 
Application to Facts section of the main opinion, Strader's crime 
of giving false information to a police officer is simply not 
part of a single criminal episode involving the theft and drug 
offenses under the definition set out in section 76-1-401. 
Therefore, it is unnecessary to meld a constitutional analysis 
with statutory interpretation, even if that exercise were 
logipemySuggested by the statute. 
ssociate Presiding Judge 
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